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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

TRUSTS-LIABILITY OF LIFE TENANT AND REMAINDERMAN FOR CARRYING CHARGES ON UNPRODUCTIVE PROPERTY-Testator put certain property,
highly productive at the time of his death, in trust, income to his grandaughter
for life, remainder over. Subsequently part of the property became unproductive,
so that if the income from the rest should have fallen below three per cent and
taxes were paid from income, the life tenant would have received nothing. The
will authorized the trustee to sell when expedient; although using due diligence, the trustee had not yet sold. In a contest between the life tenant and
remainderman, held, taxes accrued since the property became unproductive are
payable from principal, not income. Harvard Trust Co·. v. Duke, (Mass. 1939)

24 N. E. (2d) 144.
Whether expenses involved in carrying unproductive trust property are to
be borne by the life tenant or the remainderman 1 depends primarily on the settlor's intention. In some situations, his intention can be inferred from his specific directions; in other cases, the answer is- deduced from a wholly presumed
intent. Where the property is unproductive at the time the trust instrument
takes effect, there are three possible situations. The settlor may have ( I ) ordered
sale, ( 2) ordered retention, or (3) said nothing. In the first of these possibilities, it is clear that such interim expenses as taxes should be chargeable to principal,2 while in the second it is equally clear that they should be chargeable to

1 Apportionment of the proceeds from a sale of unproductive property is a problem to be distinguished from the one under discussion. On apportionment, see Brands,
"Trust Administration: Apportionment of Proceeds of Sale of Unproductive Land and
of Expenses," 9 N. C. L. REv. 127 (1931); 2 Sco'IT, TRUSTS, § 241.1 (1939);
l TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 241 (1935); 40 YALE L. J. 275 (1930).
2 Matter of Walker, 138 Misc. 879, 247 N. Y. S. 534 (1930). A recent Pennsylvania case, however, held that "in all cases [expenses] should not be charged to
and be paid by income, but that whether to be so paid,. or to be paid out of principal,
or divided .•• should be determined by considering the equities in each case." Although
the lower court had ordered payment out of corpus, the case was remanded because it
did not appear whether the decision was based on a general rule or a consideration of
the equities. In re Levy's Estate, 333 Pa. 440 at 442-443, 5 A. (2d) 98 (1939).
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income. 8 Where the trust instrument specifies a period in which the unproductive property must be retained, taxes may be charged to income during such
period,4 but not for a period of postponement merely authorized by the settlor.5
In the third situation principal usually bears the burden on the theory that the
testator, having designated a beneficiary of income, must have intended the
trust to be income-producing. 6 From this is inferred a duty on the trustee to sell
the property and make a profitable investment of the proceeds. 7 Cases in Massachusetts and New York have required some affirmative showing of an intention
that the property be sold before allowing the burden to be shifted to principal.8
But according to authority, 9 it is everywhere held, as in the principal case, that
where property, productive when the trust was set up, has subsequently become
unproductive, taxes and similar charges are payable from corpus.10 Barring
special circumstances, this would doubtless conform to the settlor's intention.
Since in appointing a life tenant the settlor's aim is in most cases chiefly to benefit that person and only incidentally to dispose of income from property, it would
seem inconsistent therewith to permit taxes on unprofitable land to absorb the
income of the trust. Rather is it more equitable to reduce the corpus, thereby
throwing the burden for the most part on the remainderman but also to some
extent, in the form of reduced income, on the life tenant.
lames D. Ritchie

Matter of Satterwhite, 262 N. Y. 339, 186 N. E. 857 (1933).
This might be the result unless the will can be interpreted as placing on the
trustees an imperative duty to convert. Such duty was found lacking in Love v. Engelke,
368 Ill. 342, 14 N. E. (2d) 228 (1938). Similar language surrounded perhaps by
different circumstances brought the opposite result in Furniss v. Cruikshank, 230 N. Y.
495, 130 N. E. 625 (1921), modified, 231 N. Y. 550, 132 N. E. 884 (1921).
5 Furniss v. Cruikshank, 230 N. Y. 495, 130 N. E. 625 (1921), modified 231
N. Y. 550, 132 N. E. 884 (1921).
6 Brands, "Trust Administration: Apportionment of Proceeds of Sale of Unproductive Land and of Expenses," 9 N. C. L. REv. 127 at 135 (1931); 2 PERRY,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 949 (1929); 2 ScOTT, TRUSTS, §§ 233.4, 240 (1939);
1 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 233, comment m (1935).
1 2 ScOTT, TRUSTS,§ 240 (1939).
8 Matter of Andreini, 165 Misc. 297, 300 N. Y. S. 1224 (1937); Creed v.
Connelly, 272 Mass. 241, 172 N. E. 106 (1930), which the principal case said was
decided "upon the supposed intent of the testator that the general rule should apply to
a situation of which he had full knowedge and which he must have expected might
continue." 24 N. E. (2d) 144 at 146. See, In re Richards Will, (Surr. Ct. 1939-)
10 N. Y. S. (2d) 510 at 515 (1939).
9 2 ScOTT, TRUSTS,§ 233.4 at pp. 1273-1274 (1939).
10 In re Easton's Estate, (Surr. Ct. 1939) 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 295; Springfield Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. v. Wade, (Mass. 1940) 24 N. E. (2d) 764.
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